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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

)

NO. 41355

)
)

BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CR 2012-1608·1

)

)
JOSHUA THOMAS BENNETT,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)

________ )

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joshua Thomas Bennett asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of
the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 388 (Ct. App. March 3,
2015) (hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment
of Conviction, is not in accord with applicable decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and Idaho Supreme Court.
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APR 2 0 2015
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Following a jury trial at which the chief witness against him was Levi Sermon, a
confidential informant, Mr. Bennett was found guilty of delivery of a controlled substance
(marijuana).

(See generally Trs.)

During cross-examination of Mr. Sermon, defense

counsel attempted to ask Mr. Sermon about his prior activities as a cocaine dealer, but
the district court sustained the State's relevance objection. (Tr. (Vol. 11), p.13, L.17 p.15, L.17.)

This was despite the fact that, on direct examination, Mr. Sermon had

testified regarding his past as a cocaine dealer, and claimed that making amends for his
past work as a drug dealer was the main reason why he began working as an informant.
(Tr. (Vol. I), p.222, Ls.10-16.)
Mr. Bennett received a unified sentence of five years, with two-and-one-half

years fixed (R., pp.131-32), and filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., p.140.) On appeal,
Mr. Bennett argued that the district court erred, and violated his Sixth Amendment right
to confront his accuser, when it sustained the State's relevance objection during his
attempt to cross-examine the State's key witness regarding a matter testified to on
direct examination that concerned the witness' bias, interest, or motive. (Opinion, p.1.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Bennett's conviction and sentence, finding that
any error committed by the district court was harmless. (Opinion, pp.4-6.) Mr. Bennett
filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
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ISSUE
Is the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Bennett's Judgment of Conviction
not in accord with applicable decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the
Idaho Supreme Court?
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ARGUMENT
The Idaho Court Of A eals' 0 inion Affirmin Mr. Bennett's Jud ment Of Conviction Is
Not In Accord With Ap licable Decisions Of The United States Supreme Court And The
Idaho Supreme Court
Introduction

A.

On appeal, Mr. Bennett argued that he should have been permitted to crossexamine the State's confidential informant regarding that informant's prior activities as a
cocaine dealer.

The Court of Appeals determined that any error committed by the

district court was harmless.

Mr. Bennett asserts that the deprivation of his Sixth

Amendment right to confront his accuser affected the outcome of his case and therefore
could not have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Or inion Affirming Mr. Bennett's Judgment Of
Conviction ls Not Likely In Accord With Applicable Decisions Of The United
States Supreme Court And The Idaho Supreme Court
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only

"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so, but, ultimately, the
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the
Supreme Court. I.A.R. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered
though.

Rule 118(b) lists five factors which must serve as the starting point in

evaluating any petition for review:
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first impression;
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court;
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior
decisions;
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as
Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and
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to call for the

5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further
appellate review is desirable.
I.AR. 118(b).
As set forth below, the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case is not in accord with
applicable decisions of the United States Supreme Court because Mr. Bennett's Sixth
Amendment right to cross examine the State's confidential informant was curtailed. See

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974).

Additionally, the Court of Appeals

incorrectly determined that the deprivation of this right was harmless. State v. Sheldon,
145 Idaho 225, 230, 178 P.3d 28, 33 (2008) ("To hold an error harmless, this Court
must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.")

C.

Thi~ Court Should Grants Mr. Bennett's Petition For Review, Because The
District Court Erred, And Violated Mr. Bennett's Sixth Amendment Right To
Confront His Accuser, When It Sustained The State's Relevance Objection
During His Attempt To Cross-Examine The Confidential Informant Regarding
Matters Testified To On Direct Examination And That Concerned His Bias,
Interest, Or Motive

1.

Relevant Factual Background

At trial, after establishing that confidential informant Levi Sermon was being paid
$200 to $300 for each controlled buy he completed for police (Tr. (Vol. II), p.13, Ls.416), 1 defense counsel attempted to cross-examine him regarding his past as a drug
dealer, as follows:
Q.

How many times did you sell cocaine?

[Prosecutor:] Your Honor, I'm going to object. That's not relevant to this
particular inquiry.
1

He had previously worked as an informant to avoid a conviction for selling cocaine.
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.11, L.11-p.12, L.2.)
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[Defense counsel:] I believe it is, Your Honor. They raised fl yesterday his past, his drug dealing. I think we're entitled to go into it because it
affects his credibility.
[Prosecutor:] His prior conduct years ago does not affect his credibility on
the issues of this date. The number of times he may have engaged in a
felony itself does not affect his credibility on this date.
[Defense counsel:] We've talked about it already. She brought it up
yesterday, and I'm following up today. And he - without any objection, he
started
he talked about selling cocaine. That was what his prior felony
was. So I'm asking him how many times he did it.
THE COURT:
I don't know how long ago we're talking about.
Because it may not be relevant at this point.
[Defense counsel:] All right. I guess I could ...
THE COURT:
I mean, was it more recent than
lay some kind of foundation.

I think you need to

[Defense counsel:] Okay. Thank you.
Q.
After your bust for cocaine delivery, did you sell cocaine after that
point?
A.

No.

Q.

But you did before that point?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. How long before that point?

THE COURT:

Okay. I don't know when he was busted for -

Q.

When were you busted for cocaine sales?

A.

I believe it was 2009.

Q.

Okay.

[Prosecutor:] Your Honor, I'm going to object to any further inquiry. He
hasn't been convicted of that. I allowed some of it because I felt it was
relevant to the cooperation agreement and why he was working in the first
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place. But going into specific instances is completely inappropriate, and
it's not a conviction. So I'm going to object to any further inquiry into this.
[Defense counsel:] Your Honor
THE COURT:

It was four years ago.

[Defense counsel:] Yes. But we're establishing what this gentleman's
knowledge of his drug trade is. He's the one that mentioned it yesterday.
THE COURT:
sufficiently.

I'll sustain the objection.

I think it's been argued

[Defense counsel:] Okay.
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.13, L.17-p.15, L.17 (emphases added).)
During the State's direct examination of Mr. Sermon, it had inquired as to why he
"start[ed] working [as an informant] for the sheriff's office in the first place," to which he
responded,
I used to be a drug dealer. All I could think about every night was how
many kids' lives I'd ruined, how many mamas' babies is out doing drugs
because of me. I feel like I'm giving back and doing something that's right.
No mom or parent should have to see that.
(Tr. (Vol. I), p.222, Ls.10-16.)
Because l.R.E. 611 (b) provides that "[c]ross-examination should be limited to the
subject matter of direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness,"
and because the answer sought was relevant to the confidential informant's motivation
to testify, the district court abused its discretion when it sustained the State's relevance
objection to his attempt to cross-examine the confidential informant regarding matters
he testified to on direct examination, namely his motivation for acting as an informant. 2

2

Because this issue is non-constitutional, Mr. Bennett will discuss it first. See State v.
Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 6 (2010) (W. Jones, J., concurring) ("It is a fundamental principle of
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Additionally, the district court's decision to sustain the State's objection deprived
Mr. Bennett of his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.

2.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sustained The State's
Relevance Objection

Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
I.R.E. 401. The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, "The credibility of a witness is
always material." State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 38 (Ct. App. 1988). Quoting the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the similar federal rule of evidence, the Court
of Appeals has explained that evidence that bears on credibility is relevant, and that
'"[b]ias may be induced by a witness' ... self-interest.'

Generally, 'Proof of bias is

almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has
historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and
truth of a witness' testimony."' State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 540 (Ct. App. 2012)
(quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984)) (citations omitted).
Idaho Rule of Evidence 611 (b ), in relevant part, provides, "Cross-examination
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting
the credibility of the witness." I.R.E. 611 (b). The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained,
"The appropriate scope of cross-examination includes not only the facts testified to on
direct examination, but other facts connected with those facts, directly or indirectly,
tending to explain, modify, or qualify the inferences resulting from the direct

our jurisprudence that courts pass on deciding constitutional issues if the case can be
decided without addressing the constitutional question.") (citations omitted).
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examination." State v. Brummett, ·150 Idaho 339, 344 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v.
Starry, 96 Idaho 148, 150 (1974)).
Defense counsel was attempting to cross-examine Mr. Sermon about a matter he
testified to on direct examination - his motivation for acting as an informant - and about
a matter that went directly to his bias, interest, and motive in acting as a confidential
informant and testifying for the State.

Both bases for the subject on which defense

counsel sought to cross-examine Mr. Sermon were appropriate areas of inquiry under
1.R.E. 401 and 611 (b). As such, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to
recognize both the relevance of the questioning and the fact that it was an area to which
cross-examination "should be limited" under I.R.E. 611 (b).

3.

Mr. Bennett's Sixth Amendment Right To Confront His Accuser Was
Violated When The District Court Sustained The State's Relevance
Objection

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part,
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The United States Supreme Court has explained the significance of the Sixth
Amendment right to cross-examine the government's witnesses as follows:
Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a
witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the
broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly
harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve
into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the
cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit,
the witness. . . . A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is
effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing
possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may
relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality
of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is "always relevant as
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discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony." We
have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is
a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of
cross-examination.
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 3·16-17 (1974) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added). The Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "This court has consistently held that
where a defendant is seeking on cross-examination to show bias or test the credibility of
the complaining witness, the trial court should allow considerable latitude."

State v.

White, 97 Idaho 708, 713 (1976) (citing State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 375-76 (1962)).
Mr. Bennett's thwarted attempt to cross-examine Mr. Sermon regarding his
testimony on direct examination, which also concerned his bias, interest, or motive in
acting as a confidential informant and testifying against Mr. Bennett, violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront his accuser.

In preventing Mr. Bennett from cross-

examining on the issue, the district court failed to recognize what the United States
Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have recognized: that the trial court
should give "considerable latitude" to defense counsel and that "exposure of a witness'
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally
protected right of cross-examination."

4.

The Error Cannot Be Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt

Idaho Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 52 mandates that "any error ... which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded." 'To hold an error harmless, this Court must
declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility
that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Sheldon, 145
Idaho 225, 230, 178 P.3d 28, 33 (2008). Here, the defense was prevented from eliciting
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testimony from the confidential informant that went directly to the informant's bias,
interest, and motive in acting in this case. Credibility is always relevant and necessary
for a jury's determination of guilt in a criminal case. Here, although there was an audio
recording of the purported transactions, the confidential informant was the only person
physically present during the transactions and therefore, permitting the jury to hear
evidence of the informant's suspect credibility was of utmost importance.

Accordingly,

the district court's error in failing to allow defense counsel to delve into the confidential
informant's prior history as a drug dealer cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Bennett respectfully requests that this Court grant his Petition for Review. If
granted, Mr. Bennett requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction, and
remand this matter to the district court for a new trial at which he is allowed to conduct
adequate cross-examination of the State's chief witness against him.
DATED this 20 th day of April, 2015.

L~-c V---

~~

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20 th day of April, 2015, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REVIEW, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
JOSHUA THOMAS BENNETT
INMATE #87291
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707
JOEL E TINGEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
R MACKAY HANKS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
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